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U.S. government economists in the later years of the Administration of Franklin 
Roosevelt were urged to treat the Soviet Union as an ally, in the interests of winning 
the Second World War and establishing the basis for peaceful cooperation after the 
war. The onset of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of McCarthyism sullied the 
reputations of many of them, especially the two most prominent: Lauchlin Currie 
(chief economist in the White House) and Harry Dexter White (chief economist in the 
Treasury). Close examination of the parallels between these two seemingly disparate 
cases reveals that recent attempts to revive the charges are no more firmly based than 
those of the early 1950s.  
 
During World War II, the two most senior professional economists in the U.S. 
government were Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White. Classmates, friends, and 
then fellow instructors at Harvard from 1925 to 1932, they both were recruited to 
government service by Jacob Viner in 1934. Currie eventually became President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's chief economist in the White House, and White became the 
chief economist at the Treasury under Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Currie 
specialized in domestic policy and White in international policy, but both were strong 
believers in the New Deal and open international cooperation as the cornerstones for a 
successful economic strategy. Their professional careers were devoted largely to 
service in the U.S. government for the purpose of strengthening the U.S. economy, 
solving and then preventing a recurrence of the economic failings of the interwar 
period, and directing U.S. and Allied economic power toward victory over the Axis. 
That last dimension, however, was later construed as sympathy toward one 
particularly problematic member of the Grand Alliance, the Soviet Union. Both men 
eventually were accused of being Soviet spies, a charge that has been revived in 
recent years in the light of newly declassified documents. The fundamental 
contradiction between the life work of these two men and the accusations against 
them calls for a closer examination of the nature and credibility of that evidence.  
 
In earlier, independent, assessments of the arguments made against Currie and White 
the present writers concluded that in each case the evidence is ambiguous and that 
their guilt is unlikely.[1] That conclusion is strengthened when the two cases are 
examined jointly. While it is true that if one starts from a presumption of guilt, the 
recently declassified documents appear to add to the weight of the case, this is not true 
if one starts from a presumption of innocence and a skeptical view of assertions made 
by espionage agents. This paper begins by assessing the nature of the case and then 
presents some examples of how evidence that appears incriminating at first glance 
may be reinterpreted when viewed in context. We conclude with some general 
remarks about the need for caution in this debate.  
 
LIBERALISM VS. ESPIONAGE 
 
Why, apart from a general sense of fairness, should one start from a presumption of 
innocence in evaluating the evidence against Currie and White? First, by all accounts, 
neither one was a communist. They were never members of the Communist Party, and 
they were not Marxists. They were liberal New Deal Democrats whose careers were 
made in the service of the Roosevelt Administration in the 1930s and early 1940s.[2] 
Although neither was at all rich, they were upper-level government economists who 
had no need for outside financial support. To argue that they spied against their 
country raises the difficult question of motive. Second, virtually the entire case 
against them during their lifetimes came from two unreliable witnesses, the former 
communist couriers Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers.[3] Much of what 
they alleged was based on second-hand information. Both Currie and White testified 
freely and openly and denied all of the charges. No legal action was ever brought 
against either of them. If new evidence is to be judged fairly, it must to a large extent 
stand on its own.  
 
The hypothesis of this paper is that neither Currie nor White ever spied for or acted as 
an agent of the Soviet Union. Both acted consistently out of loyalty to the U.S. 
government and to the country's economic and political principles. The case against 
them arose-and persists to this day-for four reasons. First, when fear of communist 
infiltration into the U.S. government became widespread in the late 1940s, attention 
focused on those whose policy positions seemed to dovetail with the interests of the 
Soviet Union or the Chinese communists. Currie and White were far from being alone 
in this light, but they were two of the most prominent. Second, suspicion was 
aggravated by their friendships and professional associations with certain individuals 
who turned out to be Soviet agents. Third, both Currie and White further aggravated 
the situation by being open in discussing policy matters with colleagues and friends. 
Their contacts with Soviet officials and other Russians during World War II made 
such openness seem particularly troublesome once the Cold War began. Fourth, both 
men had strong personalities that many of their contemporaries found abrasive, which 
helped them succeed in Washington but also heightened the controversies surrounding 
them. The atmosphere was summed up well by Morgenthau's biographer, John 
Morton Blum, who wrote that White 
was rude, abrupt, and impatient with opposition, which he often tried to circumvent 
by going outside of normal bureaucratic channels-a habit that could be identified with 
furtiveness or even confused with subversion. He appointed some assistants who were 
almost certainly members of the Communist Party, ... and those assistants, in White's 
view, were as free to pass along information about Treasury policy to the Russians as 
was Averell Harriman, for example, free to talk to the British.[4]  
 
 
The relative importance of these various factors has shifted over time. The first 
allegations against both Currie and White came from former members of the 
American Communist Party (CPUSA) who had received government documents 
through intermediaries to pass on to Soviet KGB agents.[5] The fact that mid-level 
government economists had access to documents originating from high officials such 
as Currie and White greatly impressed their comrades and the KGB, and it was easy 
for investigators to conclude that the authors had conveyed those documents 
deliberately for espionage. Some years later, in the 1950s, Congressional and other 
investigators of Soviet influence in the U.S. government seized on what they saw as 
questionable policy decisions during the war and argued audaciously that economic 
policy had been aimed at furthering Soviet over American interests. When those 
charges proved to be baseless, the matter was largely forgotten until the late 1990s, 
when the declassification of Soviet cable traffic confirmed many of the original 
claims about Soviet wartime espionage in America.  
 
The hunt for communists in the U.S. government in the 1940s and 1950s was fueled 
in part by mutual suspicion and distrust between the hunters and the liberal New Deal 
establishment. Policies pursued by the Roosevelt Administration, especially during 
World War II, were sometimes seen by those on the right as prima facie evidence of 
communist sympathy and support. Prominent among these were White's participation 
in the drafting of the 'Morgenthau Plan' for the postwar pastoralization of Germany, 
his delaying tactics in the disbursement of loans to China, his acquiescence in the 
conveying of occupation-currency printing plates to the Soviet Union, and his desire 
to entice the Soviet Union to join the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. Those positions were motivated by a general distrust of Germany, a specific 
distrust of the government of Chiang Kai-shek, and a conviction-shared by and to 
some extent derived from President Roosevelt-that co-operation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was possible and was essential for postwar peace and 
prosperity.[6] 
 
Unlike White, Currie did not favor the Morgenthau Plan. Instead he worked on a State 
Department plan that aimed to avoid revanche and the mistakes of the Versailles 
Treaty. On China, however, he shared White's disillusionment with Chiang Kai-shek's 
commitment to reform and the war against Japan, as the Nationalists prepared instead 
for civil war against the communists. His views were cogently argued in a lengthy 
May 1943 memorandum to President Roosevelt.[7] In this memorandum he urged the 
president to disregard the threats and reproaches of the Nationalists and to insist that 
American military and financial aid has a price. Currie emphasized that U.S. national 
interests would be best served by progress toward a more honest and democratic state 
and the avoidance of civil war. Such a war would prejudice world peace after the 
defeat of Japan and Germany: "There is grave danger that another Spain is in the 
making, where great powers line up in support of different factions." The solution 
called for statesmanship of a high order, to ensure postwar co-operation rather than 
conflict between the Great Powers.  
 
When White and Currie later came under suspicion as Soviet agents, it became easy 
and fashionable to interpret their views and actions as communist-inspired and even 
treasonable. That suspicion was aggravated by the disdain that many in the Roosevelt 
Administration had for those who feared the Soviet Union and the threat of 
communism. Morgenthau expressed this disdain clearly in his defense of his plan for 
ridding Germany of its heavy industry:  
No, it is hardly likely that Russia will have the time or the inclination for aggression. 
"But," argue the fearful and the hypocritical, "we must build a bulwark against 
communism." Well, most Americans would rather rely upon democracy as a bulwark 
than upon a heavily armed Germany. And they would be right. Communism never has 
made much headway in this country because the people have something much better. 
As long as we keep it, we are in no danger of any "ism."[8]  
 
 
White and Currie, both of whom shared-to some degree-this complacent and 
unprescient view of Stalin's Soviet Union, were responsible for hiring or 
recommending large numbers of economists and others for government positions, 
especially in the late 1930s and early 1940s. They based their hiring decisions on the 
candidates' abilities and cared little for their political views beyond seeking a broad 
sympathy with the political economy of the New Deal. Being sympathetic to 
communism or even being a member of the CPUSA was not, in their view, a barrier 
to employment. White later professed to draw a distinction between ordinary 
government employment and appointment to positions with access to confidential 
information, but he probably paid little attention to it in practice. The passage of the 
Smith Act in June 1940, which criminalized advocating the forceful overthrow of the 
U.S. government, did not alter their views or practices in this regard. (CPUSA leaders 
always maintained that the party did not advocate overthrow, and the government did 
not use the Smith Act to prosecute them until 1948.)  
 
What is disturbing about the latest revival is the assignment of guilt by association, by 
inferences made out of context, and even by the repetition of unsupported assertions. 
For example, George Silverman and Gregory Silvermaster were government 
economists in the 1930s and early 1940s who-we now know with some certainty-were 
also Soviet spies. They were friends of both Currie and White, who treated them as 
trusted colleagues and saw no reason not to share information about their work. In 
addition, reasonably persuasive cases have been made against a few of White's large 
staff, including Harold Glasser, Sonya Gold, and Ludwig Ullman. The appalling 
betrayal of trust by numerous people is an important revelation that emerges with 
clarity from Soviet wartime cables, but it does not show either Currie or White to 
have been a spy. Nonetheless, a recent book by Allen Weinstein and Alexander 
Vassiliev states that White was one of the sources under Silvermaster's 'control', and 
that Currie was a 'colleague in Silvermaster's network' and a 'fellow-agent'.[9] 
Another recent book, by Nigel West, calls White a 'sub-agent' of Silvermaster, and 
cites as evidence of his nefariousness that he had helped Sonya Gold and William 
Taylor get jobs at the Treasury.[10] (White had little to do with Sonya Gold, who 
worked under Ullman as an economist-not a typist, as asserted by West. Taylor was 
an economist who worked for White at the Treasury and later worked at the IMF. He 
was falsely accused of disloyalty on the basis of a second-hand report from Bentley 
and was formally cleared in 1956.) John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr conclude 
from White's and Currie's friendship with and support of Silvermaster that they were 
'unscrupulous'.[11] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin also call White an 
'agent' of Soviet intelligence, and on the basis of one conversation between White and 
an unidentified Soviet official (discussed below), they refer to the man as White's 
'controller'.[12] Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel say that 'Venona disclosures 
now make apparent that White was a very important Soviet spy - perhaps even more 
important than Alger Hiss'.[13]  
 
Currie and White were not and are not the only liberal New Deal economists to come 
under this attack, and the implications of a proper assessment of the evidence affect 
more than the reputations of two men. Of the thousands of economists working in the 
Roosevelt administration, several-perhaps dozens-did spy for the Soviet Union. But 
even if one concludes that people such as Sonya Gold, Victor Perlo, Harold Glasser, 
George Silverman, Gregory Silvermaster, Ludwig Ullman, Julian Wadleigh, and 
Donald Wheeler were spies, that does not mean that their friends, colleagues, or 
bosses were also guilty. Particularly scandalous are the assertions of guilt that 
continue to be made against William Taylor, whose only 'crime' was having worked 
for White on the development of occupation currencies during the war. In the red-
hunting era, several other government economists who had once been associated with 
Currie or White, including George Eddy, Mordecai Ezekiel, Irving Friedman, and 
Charles Kindleberger, came under varying degrees of suspicion.[14] 
 
Paul Sweezy, a well-known Marxist economist who studied under Currie at Harvard 
and worked for a time in the Roosevelt administration, was convicted of contempt in 
1953 for refusing to co-operate with legislative investigations into his personal beliefs 
(a conviction that was later overturned by the U.S Supreme Court). Other government 
economists, such as Solomon Adler, Frank Coe, and Michael Greenberg, were 
Marxists who may at one time have been members of the Communist Party but whose 
alleged involvement in espionage was based on scant evidence. Those allegations 
continue to be repeated today, often without qualification.[15] 
 
Apart from those linked to Currie or White, U.S. government economists who fell 
under suspicion because of Elizabeth Bentley's accusations included at least two men 
who may at one time have been communists (not spies), Irving Kaplan and William 
Remington, both of whom worked at the War Production Board in the early 1940s. 
Kaplan, who was named by Whittaker Chambers as a communist whom he had 
known in the 1930s, was fired from his job with the UN Secretariat in 1952 because 
he refused to testify about his or others' alleged former links to the CPUSA. 
Remington was an anti-fascist who flirted with communism and who may have 
knowingly conveyed confidential information to Bentley.[16] He was jailed for 
denying under oath that he had been associated with a communist organization as a 
university student and that he had given documents to Bentley. Remington was 
murdered by fellow prisoners, one of whom was a fanatical anticommunist.  
 
Economists, of course, were not the only targets, and many State Department officials 
(most notably Alger Hiss) also came under attack. An assessment of those charges 
would be beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that similar 
ambiguities arise as with the economists.[17] Even Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's 
confidant and Special Assistant, has come under suspicion. Eduard Mark assesses the 
view that Hopkins was 'Source 19' in a 29 May 1943 Venona decrypt that revealed 
that the date for the invasion of Western Europe had been delayed to 1944 
(information that was formally given to Stalin just a few days later). Mark concludes 
that Hopkins probably was this person, and that he had informed two Soviet officials 
with whom he had frequent legitimate dealings at the Soviet Purchasing Agency in 
Washington. Mark, however, casts considerable doubt on the allegation that Hopkins 
was a spy as opposed to a loyal back channel for Roosevelt. Mark's defense of 
Hopkins is strongly supported by David Stafford.[18] 
 
THE EVIDENCE IN CONTEXT 
[19] 
 
Similarly, White, and to a lesser extent Currie, had regular formal and social contacts 
with Russians during the war. For Currie an important example was during his time in 
1941-42 as administrator of the Lend-Lease program for China (under Harry 
Hopkins's overall direction). In July-August 1942 he was in Chungking as Roosevelt's 
personal representative for extensive discussions with Chiang Kai-shek. Inter alia he 
reported to FDR on Sino-Russian relations that 'are characterized at the moment by 
suspicion and distrust, at least on the side of the Chinese.'[20] Currie met with the 
Soviet ambassador and his military attaché 'who also quietly acts as Military Adviser 
to the Generalissimo. This latter fact was told me by the Generalissimo but is not 
acknowledged by the Russians.' Currie reported Chiang's 'fears of Russian support of 
Chinese communists.' Significantly, from the point of view of interpreting the true 
nature of the dealings of officials such as Currie and White with the Soviets in war-
time Washington, Currie continued: 'I mentioned the President's hope that a modus 
vivendi could be worked out with the Russians in post-war Europe, and his fears that 
a danger spot in the post-war world lay in Sino-Russian relations.' Later in the war, as 
deputy head of the Foreign Economic Administration, Currie also worked with Dean 
Acheson on committees dealing with Lend-Lease for the Soviet Union, an assignment 
that involved regular socializing with Russian delegates.  
 
White was the Treasury's chief liaison with the Soviet embassy, where he often met 
with the Ambassador and other senior officials. Although he spoke no Russian 
himself, he occasionally encountered Russian businessmen through social contacts. 
Throughout 1944, he met with a Soviet delegation both in the Treasury and socially, 
to negotiate terms for their membership in the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank). In the spring of 1945, he participated in the San Francisco 
conference to establish the United Nations, where he met not only with Soviet 
officials but with Russian journalists who were covering the meetings. Many of these 
contacts, presumably unbeknownst to White but now known to us through the 
declassified decrypts of the VENONA project, were regularly reporting back to 
Moscow through the KGB.  
 
Currie's and White's friendships and willingness to associate with American and 
Russian communists made them attractive targets for Soviet intelligence. Code names 
alluding to both men appear several times in the VENONA traffic, and several of 
those cables reveal the lengths to which the Soviets went to obtain information from 
them. Currie is referred to in eight cables as 'Page', from June 1943 to March 1945. 
White is referred to in 15 cables under the code names 'Jurist', 'Lawyer', and 'Richard', 
from April 1944 through May 1945. Those on Currie refer almost exclusively to his 
contacts with Silverman and Silvermaster, both of whom were evidently reporting 
whatever they learned to the KGB. By 1945, KGB officers in New York were 
requesting permission from Moscow to try to meet Currie directly, but their superiors 
in Moscow replied that they should leave the responsibility to Silvermaster. The key 
question raised and left open by this cable traffic is whether Currie knew what his 
friends were up to.  
 
As for White, the VENONA cables fall into three broad categories: those that contain 
reports on White's views conveyed by American spies (similar to those on Currie), 
those reporting conversations between White and various Russians, and those that 
provide only general context or contain no usable information. White's interactions 
with Russians clearly were more direct and extensive than Currie's, but they raise the 
same question. Were these conversations a form of espionage, or merely indiscretions, 
or a legitimate exercise of professional judgment to pursue U.S. policy goals through 
a back channel in the same way as was evidently true of Harry Hopkins?  
 
To begin to answer this question, it is first necessary to understand how weak the 
other evidence is. If these cables were confirming a likely but not-quite-proven story-
the last nail in the coffin-, then it would be reasonable to interpret them with an 
unfavorable prejudice. That, however, is not the case. As noted above, most of what 
was suspected against both men had come from two unreliable witnesses: Whittaker 
Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley. Chambers was a journalist who claimed to have 
been a courier for the CPUSA in the 1930s. He broke from the Party in the late 1930s 
and later became a leading anticommunist crusader. In September 1939, he met with 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, to whom he recited a list of people whom he 
claimed to be associated in various ways with communism. Despite his later claims to 
have known White well and to have regularly obtained classified documents from him 
before this time, he did not mention him to Berle.[21] He did, however, describe 
Currie as a 'fellow traveler' who 'helped various Communists' but 'never went the 
whole way'. Chambers' primary contact in the communist underground was George 
Silverman, and this allegation appears to refer to nothing more than that Currie was a 
friend of Silverman and occasionally gave him advice on stock-market 
investments.[22] 
 
Chambers never provided any further testimony regarding Currie, but he did go after 
White beginning in 1945. In statements to the FBI that year, testimony before a New 
York grand jury and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1948, 
and his 1952 autobiography, Chambers made several specific allegations about 
White's activities in 1936-38. He claimed that White had produced a memorandum on 
how to reform the Soviet monetary system, for Chambers to give to the Soviets; that 
he regularly turned over government documents to him for the same purpose; and that 
the Soviets had rewarded White with an oriental rug, which Chambers purchased and 
gave to Silverman to give to White. Although he wrote and spoke publicly as if White 
had given material directly to him, he testified to the grand jury that it had probably 
all come indirectly, through Silverman. 'I don't think White ever personally gave me 
material,' he stated then.[23] Silverman certainly gave White the rug that he got from 
Chambers, but he testified to the grand jury that Chambers told him he had bought it 
at a bargain price from a friend in the rug trade, and he in turn gave it to the Whites as 
a personal gift in return for their letting him stay in their home for an extended 
period.[24] Moreover, Chambers never described a single official document obtained 
from White. In 1948, he turned over to the FBI a set of notes written in hand by White 
in 1938 and claimed that it was representative of regular reports supplied by White at 
that time. Chambers, however, was vague as to how he obtained the document, which 
in any case was clearly written in the form of notes (probably during a series of 
unrelated meetings at the Treasury over a period of several weeks) and not as a 
coherent report on any topic.[25] In view of the many inconsistencies and disputed 
accounts in Chambers' various testimonies and writings, the ambiguities in each of 
these accounts should lead an objective reader to discount them.  
 
Elizabeth Bentley's testimony is of even more dubious value, as she did not even 
claim to have met either Currie or White. She gave extensive hearsay evidence, which 
was given great credence in the late 1940s and early 1950s and which continues to be 
cited as a primary source today. Bentley's primary contacts were Gregory 
Silvermaster, his wife, and Ludwig Ullman (who shared a house with the 
Silvermasters). They got information both directly and through George Silverman, 
some of which they conveyed to the KGB through Bentley. Silverman and 
Silvermaster had social access to both Currie and White, and Ullman worked for 
White at the Treasury from 1939 to 1942. After Bentley broke from the Party in 1945, 
she informed the FBI of the espionage activities in which she and her colleagues had 
engaged, and she gave them the names of everyone with whom they had come into 
contact. Currie, she reported, had 'informed' Silverman orally 'on various matters' 
including the possibility that the government was about to break the Soviet code, 
while White had given government documents to Silverman. Both men had helped 
Silvermaster and other spies obtain or keep government jobs and had used their 
positions to influence U.S. policies in ways helpful to the Soviet Union.  
 
Much of the factual basis for Bentley's core story, without the more sensational 
embellishments that she added in some of her later testimony and in her 1951 
autobiography, has been confirmed by the Venona cables or other sources. Certainly 
Silverman and Silvermaster were able to learn much about U.S. policies and about 
Currie's and White's own views through their friendship with them. Both at least 
occasionally obtained copies of government documents, probably from both Currie 
and White, but whether any of those documents contained classified information is 
not known.[26] Currie seems to have been involved in carrying out orders from 
Roosevelt to get U.S. intelligence services to return Soviet cryptographic documents 
to the Soviet Union and to cease decoding operations, and he seems to have spoken of 
it to colleagues, including William Yandell Elliott.[27] Both Currie and White helped 
Silvermaster keep his job on more than one occasion in 1942 and 1943 when he was 
attacked for being a communist, though it is reasonable to suppose that they did so 
because they believed him innocent of any wrongdoing-even if he was sympathetic to 
leftist and communist causes. (The main reason Silvermaster had come under 
suspicion was his active involvement in the labor movement in California in the 
1930s, in which he associated with leading members of the CPUSA.) And the Soviet 
Union no doubt found much to like in some of the policy positions taken by Currie 
and White, even if those positions were taken in order to further U.S. interests. 
Nothing in this story provides credible evidence of espionage or of an effort to 
undermine U.S. interests.  
 
When the FBI heard Bentley's and Chambers' stories in 1945, it informed President 
Truman's staff and initiated an intensive campaign of electronic and other covert 
surveillance of Currie and White.[28] Truman noted the flimsy basis for the suspicion 
and took no action. In January 1946, he appointed White to be the first U.S. Executive 
Director at the International Monetary Fund. Two years of FBI surveillance turned up 
no further evidence against either one. Nonetheless, the charges were revived in 1948 
when Chambers and Bentley testified, first before a grand jury and later in public to 
the HUAC, in the famous case against Alger Hiss. Both Currie and White responded 
by testifying fully and openly. Neither one ever invoked the Fifth Amendment. Both 
vehemently denied all wrongdoing or ulterior motives. White, who had been in ill 
health for two years, died suddenly and tragically of a heart attack just three days after 
his HUAC testimony. Currie went on to work in Colombia, first on assignment for the 
World Bank and later for the Colombian government, and married a Colombian 
citizen. In December 1952, he returned voluntarily to testify before a Senate 
committee. When his U.S. passport came up for renewal in 1954, the authorities 
refused to renew it on the grounds that he was living mainly abroad. (Currie was born 
in Canada and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1934.) He eventually was granted 
Colombian citizenship but continued to visit the United States frequently, often to 
teach or give public lectures, until his death in 1993.  
 
What does the recent evidence add to our knowledge of these matters? Primarily, it 
provides new information about the nature of what the KGB was able to learn by 
using American communists and KGB officers posing as officials, businessmen, or 
journalists to talk to Currie and White. Much of it, of course, was the sort of personal 
opinion and general knowledge that fills up daily conversation between friends and 
colleagues. Some of it, however, reveals how open both men could be in discussing 
policy issues. For example, a cable from New York to Moscow dated 24 June 1944, 
reads as follows (with the purported real names, in italics, replacing the code names in 
the original):  
According to Currie's information, Roosevelt's reluctance to recognise De Gaulle's 
government is explained by the fact that he is striving to compel the French to take a 
more liberal position with respect to the colonies. Currie expresses his certainty that 
Roosevelt considers the USSR's conditions for the Polish-Soviet border to be 
acceptable and that he will try to win Mikolajczyk over to a more tractable position. 
 
 
The conveyor of 'Currie's information' in this case was most likely the Polish 
economist Oskar Lange. With Roosevelt's blessing, Lange had recently been in 
Moscow for talks with Stalin and Molotov concerning the government in exile in 
London, headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and plans to form a postwar government 
in Poland. At Roosevelt's request, Lange met with Currie in June, and a VENONA 
decrypt of July 6 refers explicitly to a KGB agent who had been cultivating Lange and 
who had read the report that Lange had presented to 'Roosevelt's Secretariat'. Whether 
it was wise or appropriate for Currie to have informed Lange of Roosevelt's position 
on the border issue is debatable, but that debate should start from an 
acknowledgement that the meeting was requested by the President. To construe such a 
meeting as espionage is to totally ignore its context.[29] (The other bit of gossip, 
regarding Roosevelt's attitudes toward European colonialism and de Gaulle, was 
public knowledge.)  
 
Similarly, a VENONA decrypt of 29 April 1944, describes information allegedly 
gleaned from White:  
1. According to White's data, [Secretary of State] Cordell Hull in a conversation with 
[Vice President] Henry Wallace touched upon the question of giving us a [$]5 billion 
loan. The idea appealed to Wallace and he discussed it with [33 groups 
unrecoverable] … recommended to go to China, where in view of the critical war 
situation L.'s presence [would be] extremely useful.  
 
2. Ullman advises, that according to the British data the Germans have 7 divisions in 
the coastal defensive zone ….[30]  
 
 
Since the second paragraph allegedly conveys a report from Ullman on military 
matters, it is possible that the first paragraph is also from him, perhaps based on 
conversations when White was visiting the Silvermasters. White at this time was 
directing a Treasury effort to get both Roosevelt and the Soviets to agree to terms for 
large postwar credits to the Soviet Union, which both White and Morgenthau thought 
would help promote closer economic relations between the two great powers. Soviet 
officials initially proposed borrowing $1 billion, but the Treasury was convinced that 
a much larger commitment would be appropriate and would further U.S. strategic 
interests. At Morgenthau's request, White developed a proposal for a $5 billion loan in 
March 1944. Nine months later, in the context of preparations for the Yalta 
Conference and after the Soviets had made a counter-proposal for a $6 billion loan, 
White would up the ante to $10 billion and propose that repayment be in scarce 
strategic commodities rather than cash.[31] As these negotiations proceeded, White 
obviously would have been pleased to learn from Morgenthau that Wallace supported 
the idea, and it should not be surprising if he repeated the story to his friends or 
colleagues.[32] He may also have thought it would be helpful to inform his Russian 
contacts directly that the idea was widely supported in the U.S. government. Thus, 
regardless of whether this information was passed directly or indirectly from White to 
the Russians, nothing sinister should be read into it.  
 
The proposed loan to the Soviet Union came up again in an August 1944 conversation 
with a man identified only by the code name 'Koltsov'. The cable reporting on that 
conversation is reproduced and discussed in detail in the Appendix. In brief, it is 
likely that Koltsov was a member of the delegation with whom White had been 
negotiating in preparation for the Bretton Woods conference (and with whom he 
openly socialized). Koltsov was also acting on instructions from the KGB, and he 
reported on his conversation in detail to his superiors in New York. Although much of 
the cable was undecipherable to the American cryptologists, it is clear that White 
discussed policy matters with him, including prospects for loans under the Lend-
Lease program and the likely course of U.S. policies after the war toward Germany, 
Poland, Finland, and the Baltic countries. Koltsov may have asked for but did not get 
a document of some sort. White expressed to him his frustration at the slow pace of 
discussions about a proposed loan to the Soviet Union. Koltsov also was interested in 
White's opinions about the upcoming Presidential elections.  
 
Koltsov's report finishes by holding out the prospect of continuing meetings, either 
while 'driving in White's automobile' or at the homes of White's friends. Assuming 
that Koltsov was a member of the Bretton Woods delegation or had some other 
official cover, for White to have offered to meet him in this way does not suggest any 
sinister intent on White's part. Nor should it surprise us that a Russian official who 
had succeeded in befriending a man of White's importance would describe the nature 
of their association to the KGB in the most favorable light: i.e., as a relationship 
between a source and his handler (referring to 'his future work with us') rather than as 
a friendship with a man who was perhaps only too eager to develop useful 
contacts.[33] When asked about such contacts during his March 1948 testimony 
before the grand jury in the Alger Hiss case, White responded, 'There were four or 
five of them [in the Soviet delegation]. They entertained me and I had them all down 
to the house one afternoon.' He went on to note that some of the Russians had stayed 
in touch, and he had met them socially as late as 1947.[34] 
 
When White, assisted by Ullman, was assigned by Morgenthau to participate in the 
1945 San Francisco conference to draft the UN charter, the KGB was eager to use its 
intelligence network to get information from them about U.S. negotiating and policy 
positions. Two weeks before the conference was to start, the Moscow office cabled 
instructions to New York: 'Tell Akhmerov to make arrangements with Silvermaster 
about maintaining contact with White and Ullman in San Francisco [9 code groups 
unrecovered]' (6 April 1945). At the conference, the Tass correspondent, Vladimir 
Pravdin, interviewed White on at least one occasion and cabled a series of reports 
back to Moscow.[35] An issue of central importance to the Soviet Union was the 
proposal for each permanent member of the Security Council to have veto power, an 
idea that had been accepted by all of the great powers at Yalta, albeit with different 
interpretations, but was being resisted by smaller countries. White, responding to 
Pravdin's questions, reportedly expressed the view that the United States would 
continue to insist on acceptance of the veto but noted (incorrectly) that Truman (who 
had become President a few weeks earlier) wanted the conference 'to succeed at any 
price'.[36] White also responded to questions about the status of Poland, Anglo-
American relations, and other international topics, but the nature of his replies cannot 
be ascertained from the fragmentary decoded passages. Although one could debate the 
propriety and wisdom of White's granting such an interview, it clearly was not a case 




As is well known, the hunt for communists and spies in the federal government in the 
1940s and early 1950s spun out of control because of its failure to distinguish between 
espionage and controversial policy decisions. As Ellen Schrecker has noted in her 
analysis of the wartime Dies Committee (the forerunner of HUAC), 'the charges … 
were almost always aimed at those New Deal and wartime agencies [such as the 
Office of Price Administration and the BEW] whose liberal policies most offended 
Dies and his conservative allies'.[37] The revival of such charges in recent years is 
much more firmly rooted in facts, thanks to the declassification of secret files by the 
U.S. National Security Agency, the KGB, and other agencies. The success of Soviet 
Intelligence in penetrating the U.S. government was far greater than many people had 
believed. It therefore is tempting to move all previously unresolved cases into the 
guilty column, especially when new evidence appears to be consistent with 
longstanding suspicions and allegations. To do so, however, runs the risk of 
compounding past errors. If a fresh examination is to sift guilt from innocence, it must 
begin from a presumption of innocence.  
 
In the case of Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie, the two most prominent 
economists under this attack, a benign interpretation of the evidence emerges once 
one examines the context of their frequent contacts with Soviet officials during World 
War II. President Roosevelt was eager to develop good working relations with Stalin 
based on mutual trust, and he believed firmly in the importance of economic co-
operation with and support for the Soviet Union. Those beliefs percolated throughout 
his administration and were shared, with varying nuances, by both Hull and 
Morgenthau. For White and Currie to have carried out that policy vigorously, even if 
done through back channels and with a blind eye to the dangers of strengthening 
Stalin's hand, must be counted to their credit. That naïveté about Stalin was 
widespread in that environment has been stressed by John Gaddis: 'Americans both 
inside and outside the government demonstrated a substantial lack of sophistication in 
assessing the relationship between ideology and Soviet foreign policy during World 
War II.' [38] The unsophisticated goal was simply to defeat Germany and then to 
wage peace through economic co-operation.  
 
When Currie was being pilloried in the press during the McCarthy era, he noted with 
distress the difficulty of responding to the charges that were being made. In a letter to 
a friend, he acknowledged 'that there is some truth in most of the statements of fact. It 
is the inferences drawn from these allegations that are all wrong.'[39] Yes, Currie and 
White were friends with men and women who were communists, and some of them 
turned out to be spies. Yes, they met frequently with Russians both in the course of 
their work and socially, and some of them were Soviet intelligence agents. Yes, they 
tried to further government policies through personal contacts outside official 




Of all the pieces of evidence that have been brought to bear on Harry Dexter White's 
relationships with Soviet intelligence agents, the one that is the most damning if 
accepted at face value is a cable sent to Moscow on 4-5 August 1944 (Figure 1). It 
appears to reveal White knowingly meeting a Soviet agent, discussing sensitive and 
confidential matters of government policy with him, and then making plans for future 
clandestine meetings on a regular basis. In the world of intelligence, however, matters 
often are not what they seem. A close examination is warranted.  
 
The cable was sent from the Soviet consulate in New York to an office in Moscow. 
After decoding and translation, an FBI analyst has identified the sender (code-named 
'May' or 'Maj') as an official named Pavel Ivanovich Fedosimov. Other cables in this 
period, however, identify this code name with Stepan Zakhararovich Apresyan, who 
apparently was head of the New York office of the KGB. The cable is addressed to 
'Victor'. Though not identified in the notes to this cable, Victor (or 'Viktor') is 
identified in notes to other cables as Lt. Gen. P. M. Fitin, director of foreign 
intelligence for the Soviet Union throughout the war.[40] Maj relays a report from 
someone with the code-name 'KOL'TsOV', or Koltsov. Koltsov's identity has not been 
established, but it is known that he was not a KGB or other intelligence agent, even 
though he was acting under KGB instructions in seeking to meet with White. This 
information comes from a subsequent cable dated 1 October 1944 (cable no. 1388-
89). The relevant portion of that decrypt reads,  
On the question of the possibility of splitting ROBERT's group into smaller units 
ALBERT gave the following answer:  
 
KOLTSOV's meeting with [C% RICHARD] and KOLTSOV's attempt to obtain 
answers to a number of questions of an international character produced an 
unfavourable impression on ROBERT. ROBERT was surprised by our decision to 
have recourse to the aid of a special man for raising with [C% RICHARD] questions 
on which ROBERT [C% himself] as leader of the group, in his own words, is working 
ceaselessly. Why did we decide to ask [D% RICHARD] [25 groups unrecovered] 
 
 
'Robert' is identified as Silvermaster, 'Albert' as 'probably' Akhmerov, and 'Richard' as 
White. 'C%' and 'D%' indicate doubts about the decoding. The insertion '25 groups 
unrecovered' indicates that the remainder of the report on Koltsov's meeting has not 
been deciphered.  
 
This passage clearly reveals two key points for interpreting the August cable. First, 
Koltsov was a 'special man', not a regular agent. Bruce Craig was able to eliminate 
most possibilities for his identity and concluded that he was most likely an accredited 
member of the Soviet delegation at the Bretton Woods conference, with whom White 
had been meeting throughout 1944 to negotiate terms for Soviet membership in the 
IMF and the World Bank.[41] In any case, it certainly is reasonable to suppose that he 
was an official known to White and others in the U.S. government and whom White 
would have had no prior reason to suspect of being a spy. As noted in the text, White 
socialized regularly with the Soviets before, during, and long after Bretton Woods, 
though normally in group activities. The meeting on July 31, just one week after their 
return to Washington from New Hampshire, presumably was the first successful 
attempt by Koltsov to see White alone.  
 
The second revelation from the October cable is that the meeting with Koltsov had not 
been repeated. Either White had changed his mind about meeting regularly with 
Koltsov, or Koltsov had been overly optimistic in the first place. In either case, 
Koltsov's prediction of a second meeting in mid-August (p. 4 of figure 1) had not 
been realized. One wonders why, especially since his report to the KGB had been so 
precise about both the time and the place of the follow-up. A careful reading of the 
first cable reveals the most likely explanation. Most of the conversation is either 
political gossip or general discussion of U.S. policy options for post-war planning. At 
one point, however, between discussions of Lend-Lease and demands for reparations 
from Germany, we find the phrase, 'obtaining the document extremely risky' (bottom 
of first page of Figure 1). No context is available for this fragment. Did Koltsov ask 
for a confidential document, only to be told by White that he could not have it? Or did 
Koltsov report to Maj that he was trying through some other means to obtain a 
document pertaining to a topic he discussed with White, though he fears that getting it 
will be risky? Either is possible, but the former seems more likely.  
 
If White began this conversation thinking he was merely discussing policy matters 
with a colleague from an allied country, but if his interlocutor then began attempting 
to probe for more information to the point of asking for a document, then it is easy to 
understand why he decided not to meet alone with him again. Nonetheless, either as a 
polite way of ending the conversation or as a genuine effort to be accommodating 
before the realization set in that such meetings were a bad idea, White appears to have 
offered to meet Koltsov again for 'infrequent conversations lasting up to half an hour 
while driving in his automobile' (final page of Figure 1). Since it is difficult to 
imagine White having either the leisure or the idiocy to drive aimlessly around 
Washington in 1944 to have clandestine meetings with a man he allegedly knew to be 
a Soviet spy, Koltsov's account cannot be taken seriously. A reasonable interpretation 
is that White told him that meeting this way in his "apartment" (sic) was not very 
convenient and offered the alternative of driving him to work occasionally (which 
would have taken up to half an hour from his house in Bethesda). Koltsov, who was 
not an intelligence agent and who may have felt uncomfortable with this vague 
outcome, quite likely puffed up his account of it to the KGB with supporting details 
that made the meeting look more like a success.  
 
Other, more sinister, deconstructions of this fragmentary evidence are of course 
possible. The point is simply that one must be cautious in interpreting these 
documents and recognize that any interpretation is speculative and will necessarily 
reflect the analyst's understanding of the context. As one of us suggested in the title of 
an earlier paper, the most soundly based judgment on the evidence against Harry 
Dexter White is still that favorite of the Scottish judicial system, 'not proven'.  
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